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PROTECTING CONSUMERS THROUGH MANDATORY
DISCLOSURES: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF
EXTENDED WARRANTIES
BREAGIN K. RILEY* AND AHMED E. TAHA**
IIMAGINE that you go to a consumer electronics store and buy a large-screen television for $1,499.  At the checkout counter, the cashier asks if
you also wish to purchase an extended warranty for $249, which will pro-
vide you three additional years of coverage beyond the manufacturer’s
one-year warranty.  Would you buy the extended warranty?  What would
drive your decision?
If you are like most consumers, you would make this decision with
little idea of the probability that the television will break down during the
extended warranty’s coverage period and the cost of repairing it.  But how
would your decision and motivations change if the cashier told you there
is only a 3% chance of the television needing repair during the first four
years you own it and that the average cost of repairing the television is
$300?  These questions are the focus of this Article.
Extended warranties are important products for firms and consumers.
It is estimated that over $21 billion of extended warranties were sold on
consumer electronics, appliances, computers, and phones in 2017.1  For
companies, particularly in the low-margin, consumer electronics business,
extended warranties are low-risk cash cows.  Extended warranties contrib-
ute heavily to retailers’ income through high profit margins and so are
important members of their product portfolio.2  For consumers, extended
warranties provide value by insuring against the financial and emotional
costs of product failure.  Specifically, they cover the financial costs of re-
pairing the product and provide peace of mind for consumers who are
concerned about the product breaking down.3
Although extended warranties are popular with consumers, consumer
advocates routinely discourage people from buying them because ex-
* Breagin Riley is Assistant Professor of Marketing, Whitman School of
Management, Syracuse University; Ph.D., M.S., Northwestern University; B.S.,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
** Ahmed Taha is Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law;
J.D., Ph.D., Stanford University; B.A., B.S., University of Pennsylvania.
1. Service Contract Market Size, WARRANTY WK. (Feb. 1, 2018), http://
www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20180201.html [https://perma.cc/N5CH-
WTYV].
2. Tao Chen, Ajay Kalra & Baohong Sun, Why Do Consumers Buy Extended Ser-
vice Contracts?, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 611, 611 (2009); David A. Soberman, Simultane-
ous Signaling and Screening with Warranties, 40 J. MARKETING RES. 176, 176 (2003).
3. Chen, Kalra & Sun, supra note 2, at 611.
(285)
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tended warranties generally are poor deals for consumers.4  The
probability that a product will need repair during the extended warranty
coverage period is low.  Also, in the unlikely event that the product fails,
the cost of a repair often is approximately the price of the extended war-
ranty anyway, so extended warranties often are not money-saving products
even when consumers end up using them.5
Thus, some policymakers and prominent legal scholars have pro-
posed using mandatory disclosures to reduce extended warranty
purchases.  They have proposed requiring extended warranty sellers to dis-
close to consumers information regarding the repair rate on the covered
product during the extended warranty’s coverage period.6  Similarly, legis-
lation might also require disclosure of the average cost of repairing the
product.
Such proposals are examples of the recent interest in nonrestrictive
regulatory interventions that “nudge” people toward certain desirable be-
haviors while still allowing them to choose less desirable behaviors.7  Non-
restrictive regulations, such as the mandatory disclosures examined in this
Article, are attractive to lawmakers and scholars because, compared to
4. Id. (“[M]ost consumer magazines and experts advocate consumers not buy
[extended warranties] because they provide little value. . . .”); Eric Arnum, Ex-
tended Warranties: Something Worth Buying or Something to Avoid?, WARRANTY WK.
(Feb. 17, 2003), http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20030217.html
[https://perma.cc/FZQ8-8SXW] (“Those few [consumer] advice columns that
don’t warn against extended warranties are frequently affiliated with their sellers
in some way.”).
5. Randall Stross, A Chance To Keep Up With New Technology (for a Price), N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/20/business/
20digi.html [https://perma.cc/F2P4-F7GN] (citing Mark Kotkin, director of sur-
vey research at Consumer Reports).
6. BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY NOT?: HOW TO USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY
TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL 181 (2003) (suggesting that extended warranty
sellers be required to disclose to consumers the probability that the extended war-
ranty will be used: “Circuit City or Ford could tell you the odds of actually making a
claim against an extended warranty”); Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing
Consumers About Themselves, 3(2) ERASMUS L. REV. 93, 109 (2010) (encouraging
lawmakers to consider mandating that extended warranty sellers provide consum-
ers “information on the probability that an extended warranty would be invoked”);
S. 66, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015), http://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/
bills/2015/s66 [https://perma.cc/Q3PA-QQB6] (proposed legislation includes
requirement that sellers of extended warranties to consumers post on their web-
sites “statistical data, compiled annually, of how many times the extended warranty
has been utilized by consumers for each product for which an extended warranty is
offered, together with an explanation as to the reason the extended warranty was
utilized . . . .”).
7. For example, the book Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and
Happiness, which called for adoption of nonrestrictive regulatory approaches, was a
New York Times bestseller. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROV-
ING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
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other regulatory approaches, these regulations interfere less with free-mar-
ket principles and better preserve consumer autonomy.8
In addition, these disclosures are an intuitively appealing approach to
reducing extended warranty purchases.  When provided information
about a product’s low repair rate and/or relatively low repair cost, con-
sumers should realize that the extended warranty is a bad deal financially
for them and thus choose not to buy it.
However, whether these disclosures would be effective is unclear.  Pre-
vious research on warnings and disclaimers in other domains show that
their effects are context specific and difficult to predict.9  Some disclo-
sures, such as on-product safety warnings, can be effective.10  Other warn-
ing disclosures, however, are ineffective11 or can even perversely increase
the undesirable behaviors they are meant to prevent.12
Because of the uncertainty regarding the effect of these extended
warranty disclosures, this issue is ripe for empirical examination.  This Ar-
ticle presents the results of our experiment that seeks to answer two ques-
tions: Would the proposed disclosures change consumers’ decisions of
whether to purchase extended warranties?  Would the proposed disclo-
sures affect consumers’ motivations for their decisions?
Data are generated through a controlled experiment on over 800
American consumers.  Participants are presented a scenario in which they
are purchasing a big-screen television and are given the opportunity to
also buy a four-year extended warranty on the television.  We test the effect
of two types of disclosures.  One disclosure—the “Repair Rate Disclo-
sure”—informs consumers of the probability that the television will need
repair during the extended warranty period.  Specifically, this disclosure
states that “the likelihood that the TV will need repair during the first 4
years is 3% [or 8%].”  The other disclosure—the “Repair Cost Disclo-
sure”—informs consumers of the relatively low average cost of a repair
8. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxy-
moron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003).
9. David W. Stewart & Ingrid M. Martin, Intended and Unintended Consequences
of Warning Messages: A Review and Synthesis of Empirical Research, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING 1, 1–2 (1994).
10. Eli P. Cox III, Michael S. Wogalter, Sara L. Stokes & Elizabeth J. Tipton
Murff, Do Product Warnings Increase Safe Behavior? A Meta-Analysis, 16 J. PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING 195, 201 (1997).
11. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665–79 (2011); Kesten C. Green & J. Scott Armstrong,
Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory Disclaimers in Advertising, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MAR-
KETING 293, 302 (2012); Molly Mercer, Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Worth-
less Warnings? Testing the Effectiveness of Disclaimers in Mutual Fund Advertisements, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 429, 429–30 (2010).
12. Molly Mercer & Ahmed E. Taha, Unintended Consequences: An Experimental
Investigation of the (In)effectiveness of Mandatory Disclosures, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
405, 440–41 (2015); Debra Jones Ringold, Boomerang Effects in Response to Public
Health Interventions: Some Unintended Consequences in the Alcoholic Beverage Market, 25
J. CONSUMER POL’Y 27, 51–52 (2002); Stewart & Martin, supra note 9, at 12–13.
3
Riley: Protecting Consumers Through Mandatory Disclosures: An Experiment
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
288 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64: p. 285
even if the consumer doesn’t buy the warranty.  Specifically, the disclosure
states that “if the TV needs repair, the average cost of repair is $300.”
The experiment’s results indicate that the Repair Rate Disclosure
would reduce extended warranty purchases, but primarily by consumers
with a relatively high degree of numeracy (i.e., numerical literacy).  Unfor-
tunately, however, the least numerate consumers are most likely to buy
extended warranties.  Thus, the disclosure is an ineffective nudge for the
consumers who most need protection.  Also, the experiment’s results indi-
cate that the Repair Cost Disclosure would not significantly affect warranty
purchases.
The experiment also provides insight into why the Repair Rate Disclo-
sure would reduce extended warranty purchases by more numerate con-
sumers.  The disclosure causes these consumers to focus more on the high
cost of the warranty relative to the limited financial benefits it provides,
and to focus less on the peace of mind that the warranty offers.  Because
the extended warranty is a poor deal financially, this change in focus
makes consumers less likely to buy the warranty.  This is especially true for
consumers with a high degree of numeracy, likely because they are best
able to understand the type of numerical information that is provided in
the Repair Rate Disclosure.
The rest of this Article develops these ideas more thoroughly.  Part I
discusses the market for extended warranties and why consumers buy
them.  Part II presents an experiment testing whether requiring sellers of
extended warranties to disclose information about the covered products’
repair rates and/or repair costs would reduce purchases of extended war-
ranties.  Finally, Part III discusses the experiment’s results and their impli-
cations for regulating extended warranties.
I. BACKGROUND AND THEORY
A. The Market for Extended Warranties
An extended warranty is a service contract that covers certain repairs
or services for a product after the manufacturer’s basic warranty expires.
In addition, extended warranties often offer broader coverage than does a
standard manufacturer’s warranty, for example, by covering damage
caused by heat, moisture, and normal wear and tear.13  An extended war-
ranty’s duration is usually between one and four years, depending upon
the product category.14
Consumers typically buy extended warranties at the same time they
purchase the covered product.  Thus, although third-party insurers di-
13. Tao Chen & Baohong Sun, Essays on Extended Service Contracts: An Em-
pirical Investigation of Consumer Purchases and Intertemporal Pricing of Retail-
ers’ Extended Service Contracts 47, 49 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
14. Chen, Kalra & Sun, supra note 2, at 611.
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss2/4
2019] PROTECTING CONSUMERS 289
rectly offer extended warranties,15 consumers generally buy warranties
from the retailer that sold them the covered product.16  Retailers that sell
extended warranties generally do not themselves provide the warranty pro-
tection.  Rather, they sell the warranties on behalf of insurance companies
that provide the coverage.17  The retailer keeps a sales commission, which
has been estimated to be on average approximately half the warranty’s
price.18
An extended warranty’s price generally is based on its term and the
type and price of the product it covers.19  The warranty’s price usually is
an additional 15% to 25% of the product’s price,20 however, it varies
widely by retailer.  For example, a survey of 25 retailers found that four-
and five-year extended warranties on the same television set (which had an
average price of $1,560) ranged from 8% to 41% of the set’s price.21  In
other words, prices for these extended warranties ranged from approxi-
mately $112 to $656.
Extended warranty sales data is sparse because retailers are reluctant
to disclose their revenue and profits from these warranties.  However, it is
estimated that over $21 billion of extended warranties were sold on con-
sumer electronics, appliances, computers, and phones in 2017.22  In addi-
tion, a study of one retailer in 2003–2004 found that 33% of electronic
durables purchasers also bought an extended warranty.23
15. Nancy A. Lutz & V. Padmanabhan, Warranties, Extended Warranties, and
Product Quality, 16 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG., 463, 464 (1998).
16. Nat Pope, Chiharu Ishida, Peter Kaufman & Frederick W. Langrehr, Ex-
tended Warranties in the U.S. Marketplace: A Strategy for Effective Regulation, 33 J. INS.
REG. 67, 69–70 (2014).
17. Extended Warranties, WARRANTY WK. (Nov. 1, 2005), http://
www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20051101.html [https://perma.cc/35WT-
HSL9].
18. Id.
19. Chen, Kalra & Sun, supra note 2, at 611 (“For example, the [extended
warranty] for televisions below $199.99 costs $39.99, whereas that for televisions
priced between $200 and $499.99 would be $59.99, and so on.  Therefore [ex-
tended warranty] prices vary across price tiers but not across products or brands
within a tier.”).
20. Marianne Goldstein, Are Extended Warranties Worth the Money?, CBS NEWS
(Aug. 10, 2007, 3:36 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500200_162-
3156565.html [https://perma.cc/4HAM-NYWZ]; Chen, Kalra & Sun, supra note 2,
at 615 (study of one retailer found extended warranties were priced at an average
of 17.4% of the product price).
21. Extended Warranty Shopping, WARRANTY WK. (Nov. 28, 2008), http://
www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20071128.html [https://perma.cc/VA3P-
JACJ].
22. Service Contract Market Size, WARRANTY WK. (Feb. 1, 2018), http://
www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20180201.html [https://perma.cc/9F4N-
TZL3].
23. Chen, Kalra & Sun, supra note 2, at 615.
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B. Extended Warranties Generally Are Poor Deals for Consumers
Although extended warranties are popular, they are generally poor
deals for consumers.  Indeed, consumer advocates and organizations rou-
tinely discourage buying extended warranties.24  The probability that a
product will need repair during the extended warranty’s coverage period
is low.25  For example, repair rates for new camcorders and digital cam-
eras during the first three years of ownership are only 8%.26  Also, an ex-
tended warranty usually partially overlaps with the manufacturer’s
warranty.  For example, a consumer who buys a three-year extended war-
ranty on a camera often already has coverage for the first year under the
manufacturer’s warranty.  So the consumer is largely only really receiving
two additional years of coverage from the extended warranty.27  In addi-
tion, many credit cards automatically extend the manufacturer’s warranty
for a year on purchases made with those credit cards.28  Thus, for such
purchases, an extended warranty provides even less additional benefit.
Also, even if the product fails during the extended warranty period,
the price of the extended warranty is often approximately equal to the
repair cost.29  In other words, even a consumer who ends up using the
extended warranty will often still not save money.  Furthermore, especially
for consumer electronics, over time the prices of many products fall rap-
idly and their capabilities increase, so the benefit of repairing a product
when it breaks rather than just buying a new model falls substantially over
time.30
Extended warranties’ high cost to consumers is reflected in their
great profitability for retailers.31  Retail industry analysts estimate that re-
tailers’ average profit margin for extended warranties is between 50% and
60%, approximately 18 times that of regular products.32
24. Chen, Kalra & Sun, supra note 2, at 611.
25. Nancy Marshall-Genzer, Are Extended Warranties Worth It?, AM. PUB. MEDIA:
MARKETPLACE (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/are-
extended-warranties-worth-it [https://perma.cc/S2RR-25YG].
26. Goldstein, supra note 20.
27. As noted above, however, extended warranties sometimes cover damage
from sources (such as accidental misuse) that are not covered by the manufac-
turer’s warranty.  Thus, during the period of overlap with the manufacturer’s war-
ranty, the extended warranty sometimes provides broader coverage for the
consumer.  Chen & Sun, supra note 13, at 47, 49.
28. Don’t Buy Extended Warranties, CONSUMER REP. (Aug. 26, 2016), https://
www.consumerreports.org/shopping/dont-buy-extended-warranties/ [https://
perma.cc/P7UK-2MEH].
29. Stross, supra note 5 (quoting Mark Kotkin, director of survey research at
Consumer Reports).
30. David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to Meet the
Practice of Insurance, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES: 2004 1,
25–28 (Robert E. Litan & Richard J. Herring eds., 2010).
31. Chen, Kalra & Sun, supra note 2, at 611.
32. Id.; Chen & Sun, supra note 13, at 48.
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Retailers often rely upon extended warranties’ high profitability.  For
example, in fiscal year 2004, extended warranty sales accounted for ap-
proximately 45% of Best Buy’s operating profit.33  Similarly, in fiscal year
2004, extended warranties accounted for 3.3% of Circuit City’s sales, yet
all of its operating profits.34
More recent data on extended warranties’ profitability are difficult to
find because retailers have reduced their financial disclosures regarding
them.35  Industry analysts indicate that retailers have decreased their dis-
closure of their extended warranties business because they “don’t want to
disclose to J.Q. Public how much money they are making on these con-
tracts.”36  However, there is no reason to believe that extended warranty
sales have become less important to retailers.  Indeed, consumer electron-
ics retailers have been suffering from historically low margins and are de-
pendent on sales of extended warranties to remain profitable.37
Interestingly, the country’s largest retailer, Wal-Mart, did not sell ex-
tended warranties until late 2005,38 when it finally began offering ex-
tended warranties on consumer electronics in response to demand from
relatively upscale customers.39  This delay is rumored to have resulted
from Wal-Mart’s founders’ belief that extended warranties did not provide
good value to consumers.40  Indeed, Wal-Mart began selling extended war-
ranties generally for less than half the price of its competitors.41  In addi-
tion, Wal-Mart’s extended warranties did not take effect until after the
manufacturer’s warranties expired, eliminating extended warranty cover-
age that is largely duplicative of the manufacturer’s warranty.42
C. Why Do Consumers Buy Extended Warranties?
If extended warranties are bad deals, why do so many consumers buy
them?  A number of possible explanations exist.  First, many consumers
might be very risk averse.  An extended warranty is a type of insurance:
consumers pay a certain amount to avoid possible repair costs in the fu-
33. Robert Berner, The Warranty Windfall, BUS. WK. (Dec. 20, 2004), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2004-12-19/the-warranty-windfall [https://
perma.cc/RW4Q-8PUN].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Stross, supra note 5.
38. Berner, supra note 33.
39. Robert Berner, Watch Out, Best Buy and Circuit City, BUS. WK. (Nov. 10,
2005), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/nov2005/nf20051110_
5243_db016.html [Permalink unavailable].
40. Extended Warranties, supra note 17.
41. Id.; Berner, supra note 39.  While most retailers charged 15% to 25% of a
product’s price for an extended warranty, Wal-Mart charged only 6% to 9% of the
purchase price.  Goldstein, supra note 20.
42. Goldstein, supra note 20; Berner, supra note 39.
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ture.  The insurance literature has identified the buyer’s risk aversion as a
major determinant of the decision to purchase insurance.43
However, although most consumers probably are risk averse regard-
ing product repair costs, risk aversion likely cannot fully explain their
purchase of extended warranties.  As discussed above, extended warran-
ties’ prices usually are much higher than the expected repair costs (i.e.,
the probability of needing repairs multiplied by the costs of the repairs).
In addition, the repair costs covered by extended warranties tend to be
small and diversifiable.  Indeed, the degree of risk aversion necessary to
justify financially purchasing an extended warranty is often implausibly
high.  For example, a study of consumers’ decisions regarding whether to
buy an extended warranty on washing machines found that, for risk aver-
sion to explain the choices, consumers would have to be so risk averse that
they would reject a gamble that had a 50% chance of winning $100 and a
50% chance of losing $5 or less.44
Consumers might purchase extended warranties because they overes-
timate expected repair costs during the coverage period.  Expected repair
costs have two components: the probability that the product will need re-
pair, and the cost of the repair if one is needed.  Consumers who overesti-
mate either of these should be more likely to purchase an extended
warranty.
Evidence exists that consumers overestimate both of these.  In two
surveys in Belgium and the United Kingdom, consumers estimated the
probability that a washing machine would break down in the second or
third year after purchase.45  Although there was only a 12% probability of
such a breakdown, consumers’ median estimates in the two surveys were
21% and 33%.46  Consumers also overestimated the cost of repairing a
washing machine by 12% and approximately 60%.47  Thus, in total, their
median estimate of the expected repair costs during an extended warranty
coverage period was more than twice the actual expected costs.48
In addition to overestimating the probability that a product will need
repair during the extended warranty’s coverage period, consumers proba-
bly overweight this probability as well.  According to prospect theory, in
making decisions under uncertainty, people overweight low probability
outcomes (such as a product needing repair) and underweight high
probability outcomes.49  Thus, even if consumers know the low probability
43. Chen, Kalra & Sun, supra note 2, at 612 and sources cited therein.
44. Pranav Jindal, Risk Preferences and Demand Drivers of Extended Warranties?, 34
MARKETING SCI. 39, 40–41 (2012).
45. Marieke Huysentruyt & Daniel Read, How Do People Value Extended Warran-
ties? Evidence from Two Field Surveys, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 197, 201 (2010).
46. Id. at 201–02.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 281 (1979).
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that they will use the extended warranty, they still might give that possibil-
ity disproportionate weight in deciding whether to buy the warranty.
Finally, many consumers likely buy extended warranties at least partly
because of the emotional benefits they derive from the warranty, such as
peace of mind.  Indeed, two studies found that consumers who report
greater emotional benefits from an extended warranty are more willing to
purchase one.50  Also, sellers of extended warranties often highlight peace
of mind as a primary reason to buy them.51  Consistent with this, consum-
ers are more likely to purchase extended warranties for products provid-
ing relatively more hedonic rather than utilitarian benefits.52  In our
experiment, we also study the justifications consumers offer for buying or
not buying an extended warranty and examine whether the proposed dis-
closures change those justifications.
Whatever the reasons, extended warranties are popular with consum-
ers despite being poor financial deals.  To discourage warranty purchases,
policymakers and prominent scholars have proposed requiring sellers of
extended warranties to disclose repair rate information on the covered
products to consumers.53  A related policy that might also discourage ex-
tended warranty purchases would be to require disclosure of the average
cost of repairing the product if the extended warranty were not
purchased.
There are reasons to suspect that such mandatory disclosures would
reduce extended warranty purchases.  First, if consumers are not aware
that repair rates and repair costs are low then this new information could
lead them to understand that an extended warranty’s financial benefit
(i.e., the saving of the expected repair cost during the coverage period)
50. Huysentruyt & Read, supra note 45, at 197–98, 204, 211.  The studies cre-
ated an “emotional benefits index” created from the degree of participants’ agree-
ment or disagreement with multiple statements about the emotional benefits they
derive from insurance or a hypothetical extended warranty. Examples of the state-
ments are: “I buy insurance because it gives me peace of mind” and “If I didn’t buy
[the extended warranty] and the [product] broke down, I would feel a lot of re-
gret.” Id. at 200, 207.
51. Id. at 197, 198 n.2 (Google search demonstrating the prevalence of the
phrase “peace of mind” in websites of companies selling warranties).
52. Chen, Kalra & Sun, supra note 2, at 621.
53. NALEBUFF & AYRES, supra note 6, at 181 (suggesting that extended war-
ranty sellers be required to disclose to consumers the probability that the extended
warranty will be used: “Circuit City or Ford could tell you the odds of actually
making a claim against an extended warranty”); Bar-Gill & Ferrari, supra note 6, at
103 (encouraging lawmakers to consider mandating that extended warranty sellers
provide consumers “information on the probability that an extended warranty
would be invoked”); S. 66, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015), http://
www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2015/s66 [https://perma.cc/Q3PA-QQB6]
(proposed legislation includes requirement that sellers of extended warranties to
consumers post on their websites “statistical data, compiled annually, of how many
times the extended warranty has been utilized by consumers for each product for
which an extended warranty is offered, together with an explanation as to the rea-
son the extended warranty was utilized . . . .”).
9
Riley: Protecting Consumers Through Mandatory Disclosures: An Experiment
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
294 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64: p. 285
generally is small relative to the warranty’s cost.  Second, even if consum-
ers are already aware that the repair rates and repair costs are low, and
thus these disclosures do not provide new information, they might still be
effective as reminders of extended warranties’ limited financial benefits.
Indeed, the purpose of warnings in other domains (e.g., “consumption of
alcoholic beverages impairs your ability to drive a car or operate machin-
ery”54 and “smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema, and
may complicate pregnancy”55) is often less to inform consumers than to
remind them of dangers they already know.  In the next section of this
Article, we present an experiment testing the effectiveness of these ex-
tended warranty disclosures.
II. THE EXPERIMENT: TESTING WARRANTY DISCLOSURES
A. Participants
We recruited 820 adults in the United States from Amazon’s Mechani-
cal Turk and paid $0.50 each to participate in the experiment (442 men,
378 women, average age = 36.17, SD = 12.12).  Six people voluntarily
dropped out of the experiment before completing it and were not in-
cluded in this Article’s analyses.
Studies using participants recruited from Mechanical Turk have the
same quality responses as do studies conducted in behavioral labs.56  In
addition, the Mechanical Turk population is more diverse and older than
traditional (college-aged) behavioral lab participants57 as is reflected in
our sample statistics (see Table 1).  Thus, our sample is more representa-
tive of ordinary consumers than are college students, increasing the gener-
alizability of our results.  Indeed, as of 2016, there were 249.7 million
adults in the United States,58 but only 19.8 million people were enrolled
in colleges throughout the country.59
54. Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act, 27 U.S.C. § 215(a) (2012).
55. Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2012).
56. Michael Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s Mechan-
ical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI.
3, 3, 5 (2011) (finding that data obtained from participants recruited from
Mechanical Turk is at least as reliable as data obtained from participants recruited
via traditional methods); Gabriele Paolacci & Jesse Chandler, Inside the Turk: Under-
standing Mechanical Turk as a Participant Pool, 23 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI.
184, 186 (2014) (survey of existing research concludes that the data quality on
Mechanical Turk is “good” and that “researchers can use [Mechanical Turk] for
virtually any study that is feasible to conduct online”).
57. Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, supra note 56, at 186–87.
58. Total Population by Child and Adult Populations, KIDSCOUNT DATA CENTER,
https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/99-total-population-by-child-and-
adult#detailed/1/any/false/871,870,573,869,36,868,867,133,38,35/39,40,41/
416,417 [https://perma.cc/BH8Q-VSAW] (last visited Aug. 22, 2018).
59. U.S. College Enrollment Statistics for Public and Private Colleges from 1965 to
2016 and Projections up to 2027, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/
183995/us-college-enrollment-and-projections-in-public-and-private-institutions/
[https://perma.cc/4BJX-J8U3] (last visited Aug. 22, 2018).
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TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHICS OF EXPERIMENTAL PARTICIPANTS
GENDER
Male 53.9%
Female 46.1%
AGE
18 to 44 years old 76.3%
45 - 64 years old 21.2%
65 and older 2.3%
FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT
Yes 34.0%
No 66.0%
B. Experimental Design and Procedures
1. Overview
All participants completed the experiment online and on the same
day.  They were asked to read a hypothetical scenario in which they have
decided to buy a particular 65-inch television from a particular local re-
tailer for $1,499.99.60  Participants read that the manufacturer’s warranty
for the television is one year.  While at the checkout counter, the cashier
also asked participants if they wished to purchase an extended warranty
that, for the first four years they own the television, “covers mechanical
and electrical failures from normal use, has 24/7 zero-hassle claims and
free on-site service for large TVs, and covers all parts and labor with no
deductibles.”61
After reading this scenario, participants were asked whether they
would purchase the extended warranty and about the reasons for their
decisions.  They were also asked a number of manipulation check and
demographic questions.  In addition, they were asked about their past ex-
tended warranty purchase behavior, and they were given a brief numeracy
test.
Participants in our experiment appear to have been familiar with the
experimental scenario of being offered an opportunity to buy an extended
warranty when purchasing a television.  Eighty-seven percent of the partici-
pants reported owning a television and 79% reported having purchased a
television in the past five years.  Seventy-four percent of the participants
reported having had the opportunity to buy an extended warranty in the
60. The television price was based on the price of a 65-inch television at Best
Buy. BEST BUY, https://www.bestbuy.com/site/samsung-65-class-led-curved-
nu8500-series-2160p-smart-4k-uhd-tv-with-hdr/6213270.p?skuId=6213270
[Permalink unavailable] (last visited Jan. 9, 2019).
61. This wording is based on SquareTrade’s advertising for its extended war-
ranties on televisions. Save Up to 45% on Protection for Your New TV.*, SQUARETRADE
PROTECTION PLANS, https://www.squaretrade.com/708/tv-warranty [https://
perma.cc/TQ53-GYM4] (last visited Aug. 13, 2018).
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past five years, and 25% of the participants reported having bought an
extended warranty in that time period.  In addition, the distribution of
participants’ numeracy is similar to that of the U.S. population with 37%
on the more proficient end (versus 36% in the population overall), 25%
(versus 30%) on the less proficient end, and 38% in the middle (versus
34%).62  Thus, the participants were largely representative of typical con-
sumers within the American marketplace and appropriate for this
research.
2. Experimental Conditions
The experiment employs a 3 (Repair Rate: not disclosed, disclosed—
low, disclosed—high) x 2 (Average Repair Cost: disclosed, not disclosed) x
2 (Warranty Price: low, high) full-factorial, between-participants design.
In other words, each participant was randomly assigned to one of 12 ex-
perimental conditions.
Participants in the Repair Rate Disclosed—Low conditions read that “the
cashier tells you that the likelihood that the TV will need repair during the
first [four] years is 3%.”  In the Repair Rate Disclosed—High conditions, par-
ticipants read that “the cashier tells you that the likelihood that the TV will
need repair during the first [four] years is 8%.”  The 3% and 8% repair
rates were based on the repair rates reported by Consumer Reports for
relatively reliable and unreliable television brands, respectively.63  We
tested two repair rates to determine whether consumers would be more
likely to buy the extended warranty if a higher repair rate were disclosed.
In the Repair Rate Not Disclosed conditions, participants were not given any
information regarding the television’s repair rate.
Participants in the Average Repair Cost Disclosed conditions read that
“the cashier tells you that the average cost to repair a TV of this size is
$300.”  This figure was the approximate actual average cost of repairing a
large-screen television.64  Participants in the Average Repair Cost Not Dis-
closed conditions were not given any information regarding repair costs.
Finally, in the Low Warranty Price conditions, the extended warranty
cost $249, and, in the High Warranty Price conditions, the extended war-
ranty cost $349.  These prices were based on the range of prices offered in
the marketplace for extended warranties on televisions priced similarly to
the television used in the experiment.  The lower-priced retailers offered
extended warranty prices that were, on average, about 30% lower than the
62. Understanding Literacy & Numeracy, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/healthliteracy/learn/UnderstandingLiteracy.html [https://
perma.cc/R5D3-T9R6] (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
63. Best Brands, CONSUMER REP., Dec. 2012, at 50.
64.  Repair or Replace it?, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 2011, at 24, 27 (showing range
of average repair costs of $262 - $379 for big-screen TVs).
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higher-priced retailers.  Also, we chose prices ending in “9” because of the
popularity of this pricing strategy by retailers.65
3. Dependent Variables
After reading a version of the scenario, participants answered a series
of questions.  The first questions asked participants about their warranty
purchase intentions.  First, they answered a yes or no question: “Would
you buy the extended warranty?” (Purchase Decision).  To measure the
strength of the purchase intention, they were then asked to indicate “How
likely you are to buy the extended warranty?” (Purchase Likelihood) using a
response scale with endpoints labeled “Very Unlikely” (1) and “Very
Likely” (7).  Also, they were asked “How interested are you in purchasing
the extended warranty?” (Purchase Interest) using a response scale with
endpoints labeled “Very Uninterested” (1) and “Very Interested” (7).  In
addition, they were asked “How wise an idea is buying the extended war-
ranty?” (Purchase Wisdom) using a response scale with endpoints labeled
“Very Unwise” (1) and “Very Wise” (7).  Because participants’ responses to
all these questions were highly correlated (a = .89), we focus our analysis
on the Purchase Decision variable.
4. Justifications for Purchase Decision
We also sought to determine why the disclosures did or did not have
an effect, so we also asked participants the reasons for their warranty
purchase decisions.  In particular, to explain why they decided to purchase
or not purchase the extended warranty, they indicated whether they
agreed or disagreed with each of twenty possible justifications for buying
or not buying the extended warranty, such as “I’d sleep much better with
the extended warranty” and “The cost of the extended warranty is high
relative to the chance of something going wrong.”66  Participants provided
their agreement or disagreement with each possible justification using a
65. Robert M. Schindler & Patrick N. Kirby, Patterns of Rightmost Digits Used in
Advertised Prices: Implications for Nine-Ending Effects, 24 (2) J. CONSUMER RES. 192, 192
(1997); Karen Gedenk & Henrik Sattler, The Impact of Price Thresholds on Profit Con-
tribution — Should Retailers Set 9-Ending Prices?, 75(1) J. RETAILING 33, 33–34 (1999).
66. A full list of the justifications is provided infra Table 3.  These justifica-
tions were based on the justifications used in Hogarth and Kunreuther’s study of
extended warranty purchase behavior.  That study conducted an experiment ex-
amining how people’s extended warranty purchase behavior differs if they were
informed that their pre-existing beliefs regarding the covered products’ repair
rates and repair costs are correct.  Unlike our experiment, it did not examine the
effect of informing consumers of the true, actual repair rates and repair costs.
Robin M. Hogarth & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Making Under Ignorance: Arguing
with Yourself, 10 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 15, 30 tbl. 5 (1995).  Recall that surveys have
found that consumers do not know product repair rates and repair costs. See supra
notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
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five-point scale: Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Neither Agree nor
Disagree (3), Agree (4), and Strongly Agree (5).67
5. Numeracy Test
The disclosures we test in this Article are numerical; they provide the
repair rate and the average repair cost for a product.  However, consumers
differ in their numeracy, which has been defined as “the ability to compre-
hend, use and attach meaning to numbers.”68  Much research has found
that consumers’ numeracy can affect their decision-making.  For example,
low numeracy has been found to be associated with distorted perceptions
of risks and benefits of health screenings, impaired risk communication,
reduced medication compliance, and adverse medical outcomes.69  In ad-
dition, one study found that more numerate consumers use a more com-
plete decision-making process in choosing between two deals on products
and are more likely to choose the better deal.70  This research indicates
that consumer numeracy might affect whether and how the disclosures
examined in this Article impact consumers’ decisions of whether to buy an
extended warranty.  Thus, in our experiment, we also examined the effect
of consumer numeracy.
To measure participants’ numeracy, we gave them a brief test, based
on a longer, commonly-used numeracy test.71  In particular, we asked par-
ticipants three questions:
“If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people
would be expected to get the disease out of 100?”
“In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10
prize are 1%.  What is your best guess about how many people
67. In addition to responding to these specified justifications, participants
were given an opportunity to provide other reasons they would or would not
purchase the extended warranty.  However, very few participants provided reasons
that were not in the twenty possible justifications that they were presented already.
Specifically, only fourteen participants wrote an additional justification.  Those ad-
ditional justifications fell into seven categories: (1) Because I have kids, five respon-
dents; (2) Extended warranties are a scam, two respondents; (3) Because information
came from a third-party source, one respondent; (4) To avoid the shame of not being
able to fix my broken TV, one respondent; (5) Because I can afford it, one respondent;
(6) Because warranties are convenient, one respondent; and (7) Because it is cheaper
to purchase extended warranties in the long run, one respondent.
68. Michelle Graffeo, Luca Polonio & Nicolao Bonini, Individual Differences in
Competent Consumer Choice: The Role of Cognitive Reflection and Numeracy Skills, 6 FRON-
TIERS PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (2015).
69. Valerie F. Reyna, Wendy L. Nelson, Paul K. Han & Nathan F. Dieckmann,
How Numeracy Influences Risk Comprehension and Medical Decision Making, 135
PSYCHOL. BULL. 943, 943 (2009).
70. Graffeo, Polonio & Bonini, supra note 68, at 1, 12.
71. Valerie F. Reyna & Charles J. Brainerd, Numeracy, Ratio Bias, and Denomi-
nator Neglect in Judgments of Risk and Probability, 18 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFER-
ENCES 89, 90 tbl.1 (2008).
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would win a $10 prize if 1,000 people each buy a single ticket
from BIG BUCKS?”
“In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of win-
ning a car is 1 in 1,000.  What percent of tickets of ACME PUB-
LISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?”
We measured each participant’s numeracy by the number of ques-
tions (0 – 3) that he or she answered correctly.
6. Results
a. Extended Warranty Purchases
Figure 1 displays the percentage of participants in each experimental
condition who stated that they would purchase the extended warranty.
The lighter bars represent participants offered the lower-priced extended
warranty ($249), and the darker bars represent participants offered the
higher-priced extended warranty ($349).  The averages across both war-
ranty prices are indicated by the black lines.
FIGURE 1 EXTENDED WARRANTY PURCHASE INTENTIONS
BY DISCLOSURE PROVIDED
We used logistic regression to analyze the data.72  The dependent va-
riable—Purchase Intention—–had the value of 1 if the participants said
they would buy the extended warranty and the value of 0 if they said they
would not buy it.  As independent variables, we used dummy variables to
indicate whether participants received a Repair Rate Disclosure and/or
the Repair Cost Disclosure and to indicate whether the disclosed repair
rate, if any, was high (8%) or low (3%).  Specifically, the variable Repair
Rate was coded 1 if participants received any disclosure on the repair rate,
and 0 otherwise.  Also, if participants received the high Repair Rate Disclo-
sure then both Repair Rate and the variable Repair Rate High were coded
1, but if participants received no or the low Repair Rate Disclosure then
72. Logistic regression is appropriate because the dependent variable—
Purchase Intention—is binary (i.e., participants stated that they either would or
would not buy the warranty).
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Repair Rate High was coded 0.  In addition, the variable Repair Cost was
coded 1 if participants received the Repair Cost Disclosure, and 0
otherwise.
The regression results show that the Repair Rate Disclosures reduced
the proportion of participants who would buy the extended warranty.  A
significant main effect of Repair Rate emerged (b = -.95 SE = .20
Wald c2 = 23.11, df = 1, p <.001).  Also, paired contrasts provide additional
detail.  Specifically, 38% of participants who did not receive any disclosure
said they would buy the warranty (SE = .04 95% CI = .31, .45), but only
23% of the participants who received only a Repair Rate Disclosure said
they would buy the warranty (SE = .03 95% CI: .18, .28), as did only 19% of
the participants who received both a Repair Rate Disclosure and the Re-
pair Cost Disclosure (SE = .03 95% CI: .14, .25).  There was not a statisti-
cally significant difference in the behavior of participants who received the
low (3%) Repair Rate Disclosure and the high (8%) Repair Rate
Disclosure.
In contrast to the Repair Rate Disclosures, the Repair Cost Disclosure
did not affect warranty purchases.  No significant main effect of Repair
Cost emerged (b = -.11 SE = .16 Wald c2 = .44, df = 1, p = .51).  Indeed,
39% of participants who received only the Repair Cost Disclosure said they
would buy the extended warranty (SE = .04 95% CI: .31, .46), which is not
a statistically significant difference from the 38% of participants who re-
ceived no disclosure who said they would do so.  Nor was there an interac-
tion between Repair Rate and Repair Cost.  In other words, the Repair
Cost Disclosure’s lack of an effect did not depend on whether a Repair
Rate Disclosure was also given.  Recall that 19% of participants who re-
ceived both the Repair Cost Disclosure and a Repair Rate Disclosure said
they would buy the warranty, which is not a statistically significant differ-
ence from the 23% of participants who received only a Repair Rate Disclo-
sure who said they would buy it.
Finally, the cost of the extended warranty affected consumer behav-
ior.  A significant main effect of Warranty Price emerged (b = -.20 SE = .08
Wald c2 = 6.34, df = 1, p =.01), indicating that a greater percentage of
consumers purchased the extended warranty when its price was $249
rather than when it was $349.  For example, when only a Repair Rate Dis-
closure was given, participants were almost 60% more likely to buy the
warranty when it cost only $249 (28% of participants) rather than $349
(18% of participants).
b. Numeracy
Although the Repair Rate Disclosures reduced purchases of the ex-
tended warranties, the magnitude of this effect was highly correlated with
participants’ numeracy.  As displayed in Figure 2, the Repair Rate Disclo-
sures were much more effective in reducing warranty purchases of highly
numerate consumers than of less numerate ones.  Across all experimental
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conditions, the Repair Rate Disclosures reduced the proportion of the
less-numerate participants (i.e., those who answered zero or one of the
numeracy questions correctly) who bought the warranty by only a statisti-
cally insignificant 18% (i.e., from 0.4 to 0.33).  In contrast, the disclosures
reduced the warranty purchases by about a third (i.e., from 0.39 to 0.26)
for participants who answered two of the numeracy questions correctly,
and by more than 70% (i.e., from 0.35 to 0.10) for participants who an-
swered all three questions correctly.
FIGURE 2
EXTENDED WARRANTY PURCHASE INTENTIONS BY NUMERACY
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The finding that the Repair Rate Disclosure is much less effective in
deterring consumers with low numeracy from buying an extended war-
ranty is especially important because low-numeracy consumers are most
likely to buy extended warranties in the first place.  In our experiment, we
asked participants several questions about their past real-world extended
warranty purchases.  Their responses are displayed in Table 2.
Participants with lower numeracy were more likely to have purchased
an extended warranty on a television and on other products.  The large
magnitude of these differences is noteworthy.  For example, compared to
the most numerate participants, the least numerate consumers were about
three times as likely to have purchased an extended warranty on a televi-
sion in the past five years (21% versus 7%), and more than 85% more
likely to have purchased an extended warranty on some product in the
past year (24% versus 13%).  This suggests that Repair Rate Disclosure will
be least effective on those consumers who purchase the most extended
warranties: less-numerate consumers.
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TABLE 2 PARTICIPANTS’ PRIOR EXTENDED WARRANTY PURCHASES
BY NUMERACY
HAVE YOU
HAVE YOU PURCHASED
PURCHASED HAVE YOU AN
HAVE YOU AN EVER PUR- EXTENDED
EVER PUR- EXTENDED CHASED AN WARRANTY
CHASED AN WARRANTY EXTENDED ON ANY
NUMERACY EXTENDED ON A TV IN WARRANTY PRODUCT IN
TEST SCORE DESCRIPTIVE WARRANTY THE PAST 5 ON ANY THE PAST
(N per cell) SSTATISTICS ON A TV? YEARS? PRODUCT? YEAR?
0 or 1 Yes 25% 21% 61% 24%
(N=210) # of 181 181 159 159
Responses
2 Yes 27% 18% 56% 20%
(N=310) # of 288 288 274 274
Responses
3 Yes 13% 7% 48% 13%
(N=300) # of 260 260 266 266
Responses
c. Justifications for Purchase Decisions
Recall that participants were asked the extent to which they agreed or
disagreed with each of twenty possible justifications for buying or not buy-
ing the extended warranty.  We examined participants’ justifications for
their warranty purchase decisions by submitting participants’ responses to
a factor analysis, which is a statistical analysis used to identify unobserved
variables (i.e., factors) that give rise to the correlations among observed
variables (e.g., the level of participants’ agreement or disagreement with
each of the twenty justifications).  The factor analysis identified five dis-
tinct factors as underlying participants’ decisions of whether to purchase
the extended warranties.  In order of importance, assessed by percentage
of variance explained, these factors were:
Peace of Mind – e.g., extended warranty would allow participant
to “sleep better at night” or avoid regret if the television were to
need repair
Warranty’s Cost – e.g., the warranty’s cost is high or low, relative
to the cost of the television and/or relative to the probability of
the television needing repair
Experience – e.g., participant typically buys or doesn’t buy ex-
tended warranties
TV’s Value – e.g., the television is or isn’t worth much to the
participant
Optimism – e.g., the participant believes the television isn’t likely
to need repair.
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Table 3 presents the specific items corresponding to each factor, the
exact percentages of variance explained, and the component loadings in
the factor analysis.
Thus, multiple motivations underlie consumers’ decisions of whether
to purchase extended warranties, such as the desire for peace of mind and
the cost of the warranty, including its cost relative to the financial benefit
it provides.  For insight into why the disclosures were effective or ineffec-
tive, we also examined how the disclosures affected the justifications par-
ticipants gave for their warranty-purchase decisions and whether these
justifications were affected by participants’ numeracy.  To do this we con-
ducted a mediation analysis.
TABLE 3 EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS WITH VARIMAX ROTATION FOR
JUSTIFICATION MEASURES
I’d sleep much better with the extended 0.66
warranty.
I’d regret not having the extended warranty 0.65
if the TV breaks down.
Even though the chance of the TV breaking 0.64
down is small, I don’t want to risk it.
PEACE OF MIND The cost of repairing/replacing the TV 0.62
37.42%; a = .84 would be much higher than the cost of the
extended warranty.
I’m unlucky. Things I own seem to break 0.54
down.
The cost of the extended warranty is not 0.56
high relative to the chance of something
going wrong.
The cost of the extended warranty is small 0.62
relative to TV’s cost.
The cost of the extended warranty is high 0.62
relative to the chance of something going
wrong.
Costs The extended warranty is 0.72
8.80%; a = .84 expensive.
The extended warranty is expensive relative 0.76
to the TV’s cost.
The extended warranty is not expensive. 0.58
I’d regret “wasting money” on the extended 0.63
warranty if there was no breakdown.
Experience I don’t trust insurance and warranties. They 0.64
6.88%; a = .81 don’t cover everything and require you to
keep track of lots of paper, etc.
I typically buy extended warranties. 0.70
I usually don’t buy extended warranties. 0.76
Value The TV is worth a lot to me. 0.82
6.33%; r = .73 The TV is not worth a lot to me. 0.88
I’m lucky. Things like breakdowns don’t 0.78
Optimism seem to happen to me.
5.07%; r = .49 The TV’s nature makes it not likely to break 0.68
down.
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Mediation occurs when an independent variable affects a dependent
variable through a third variable (a mediator).  In other words, the inde-
pendent variable affects the dependent variable because the independent
variable affects a mediator and, in turn, the mediator affects the depen-
dent variable.73  Here, the disclosures could affect consumers’ purchases
of extended warranties by changing the weight that consumers give to cer-
tain justifications for buying or not buying the warranties.
Mediation analysis requires regression.  We used three independent
variables and their interactions: whether participants did (1) or did not
(0) receive a Repair Rate Disclosure, regardless of whether it is low or
high; whether participants did (1) or did not (0) receive the Repair Cost
Disclosure; and the number of correct responses on the numeracy test (0,
1, 2, or 3).74
In the full model, the effects of peace-of-mind justifications on war-
ranty purchase were positive (b = 2.32 SE = .25, Z = 9.37, p < .001), and the
effects of cost-based justifications on warranty purchase were negative (b =
-.73 SE = .23, t = -3.15, p = .002).  This indicates that participants’ using
peace-of-mind justifications increases the likelihood of warranty purchase
while using cost-based justifications decreases it.  The analysis also holds
when controls for the price of the extended warranty and receiving the
high Repair Rate Disclosure are included.
The analysis also reveals evidence of moderated mediation.75  Specifi-
cally, there was a significant negative interaction of numeracy and Repair
Rate Disclosure on peace-of-mind justifications (b = -.96 SE = .21, p <
.001), which indicates that as consumers’ numeracy increases, a Repair
Rate Disclosure decreases the impact of the desire for peace of mind on
the decision of whether to purchase the extended warranty.  Similarly, the
analysis revealed a significant positive interaction of numeracy and a Re-
pair Rate Disclosure on the use of cost-based justifications (b = .75 SE =
.33, p = .023).  This indicates that as consumers’ numeracy increases, a
Repair Rate Disclosure increases the impact of justifications related to the
extended warranty’s cost on the decision of whether to purchase the ex-
tended warranty.
Further, the indirect effects of the Repair Rate Disclosure and numer-
acy were not significant.  When the effects of numeracy and the Repair
73. Kristopher J. Preacher, Derek D. Rucker & Andrew F. Hayes, Addressing
Moderated Mediation Hypotheses: Theory, Methods, and Prescriptions, 42 MULTIVARIATE
BEHAVIORAL RES. 185, 186 (2007).
74. Before conducting the mediation analysis, we first confirmed that the data
are appropriate for mediational analysis.  Rik Pieters, Meaningful Mediation Analysis:
Plausible Causal Inference and Informative Communication, 44 J. CONSUMER RES. 692,
692–93 (2017).  The analysis confirming this appropriateness, and the complete
mediation analysis are available from the authors.
75. Moderated mediation occurs when the effect of an independent variable
on a dependent variable via a mediator variable differs depending on the level of
another variable (the moderator variable).  Preacher, Rucker & Hayes, supra note
73, at 193.
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Rate Disclosure on the justifications are accounted for, the analysis re-
vealed no additional impact of the interaction of numeracy and the Repair
Rate Disclosure on the warranty purchase decision (b = .28 SE = 1.01, F =
.28, p = ns).
How consumers’ numeracy impacts the effect of the Repair Rate Dis-
closures can also be seen in Figures 3 and 4.  Recall that participants rated
their agreement or disagreement with each of twenty possible justifications
for buying or not buying the extended warranty by using a five-point scale:
Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Neither Agree nor Disagree (3),
Agree (4), and Strongly Agree (5).  Figure 3 displays the average level of
agreement that participants expressed with the justifications related to
peace of mind.  Figure 4 displays the average level of agreement that par-
ticipants expressed with the justifications related to the warranty’s cost.
Those figures show that the Repair Rate Disclosures significantly de-
creased the use of peace-of-mind justifications and increased the use of
cost-based justifications by the most numerate participants.  The Repair
Rate Disclosures had similar, but smaller, effects for the participants in the
middle-numerate group, but no such effect for the least-numerate group.
FIGURE 3
USE OF PEACE-OF-MIND JUSTIFICATIONS BY NUMERACY
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FIGURE 4
USE OF COST-BASED JUSTIFICATIONS BY NUMERACY
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In summary, the experiment provides evidence that the Repair Rate
Disclosure changes the weight that some consumers give to peace of mind
and cost considerations when deciding whether to purchase an extended
warranty.  In particular, providing the repair rate causes more numerate
consumers’ decisions to be driven more by the cost of the warranty and
less by the desire for peace of mind.  Thus, disclosing the repair rate alters
the decision-making process toward more financial-cost-and-benefit-based
reasoning for more numerate consumers, while the process remains more
peace-of-mind focused for less-numerate consumers.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Lawmakers and scholars often propose mandatory disclosures as a pri-
mary method of consumer protection.  The reasoning behind this ap-
proach is that consumers armed with relevant information will make
better decisions.  Disclosures are also seen as being a less intrusive way of
achieving policy goals than are other regulatory techniques.  Past research
has found, however, that the effectiveness of such disclosures greatly de-
pends upon their context.
Because extended warranties are generally bad financial deals for
consumers they have also become a target of potential disclosures.  This
Article presents evidence that requiring extended warranty sellers to dis-
close product repair rate information could somewhat reduce warranty
22
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purchases, but disclosing average repair cost information would not im-
pact purchases.
The experiment also provides insight into why repair rate informa-
tion would reduce warranty purchases.  Consumers who put more weight
on the emotional benefits (peace of mind) offered by an extended war-
ranty are more likely to purchase the warranty.  In contrast, consumers
who put more weight on the financial costs and benefits of the warranty
are less likely to purchase it.  This makes sense because extended warran-
ties generally are poor financial deals for consumers.
The experiment found evidence that Repair Rate Disclosures impact
some consumers’ warranty purchase decision-making process by changing
the weight that those consumers give to different justifications for buying
or not buying the warranty.  By informing or reminding consumers of the
low probability that the product will break down during the warranty’s
coverage period, the Repair Rate Disclosure reduces consumers’ need for
the peace of mind that comes with an extended warranty.  It also causes
them to focus more on the cost of the extended warranty, which is high
relative to the limited financial benefits it provides—the warranty only
pays off in the unlikely event that the product needs repair during the
warranty’s coverage period.  As a result, the Repair Rate Disclosure
reduces purchases of the warranty.
The experiment also found that the disclosure is much more effective
in discouraging warranty purchases by highly-numerate consumers than by
less-numerate consumers.  The Repair Rate Disclosure gives consumers in-
formation in percentage form: the probability that the product will need
repair during the first few years of ownership.  As the numeracy test in the
experiment confirmed, many people have difficulty understanding per-
centages.  Thus, it is unsurprising that the Repair Rate Disclosure is much
more effective on consumers who are better able to understand it.
From a public policy perspective, however, the much smaller effect of
the Repair Rate Disclosure on the least-numerate consumers is problem-
atic.  Less- numerate consumers are much more likely than more-numer-
ate consumers to buy extended warranties.  Thus, the disclosure provides
the least protection for the most vulnerable consumers.
This problem is unlikely to be limited to extended warranties.  Other
products, such as prepaid credit cards, also appeal more to people with
lower numeracy and decrease consumer welfare.  Consumers with low
numeracy are more prone to poor purchase decisions, such as those
demonstrated in our experiment, and their post-purchase behaviors (e.g.,
in the subprime mortgage crisis) can be economically devastating.76  Be-
cause of their numerical limitations, however, such consumers are difficult
76. Kristopher Gerardi, Lorenz Goette & Stephan Meier, Numerical Ability
Predicts Mortgage Default, 110 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11267, 11267, 11271
(2013) (finding that, of borrowers who took out subprime mortgages, those with
lower numerical ability were more likely to default on these mortgages).
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to influence even using the straightforward Repair Rate Disclosure tested
in our experiment.  Thus, policymakers might need to be more creative in
protecting such consumers, perhaps by developing simple graphics and
language that are easier for these consumers to understand.77
77. See, for example, Pope, Ishida, Kaufman & Langrehr, supra note 16, at 15
(encouraging regulators to “simplify [the] contractual language” of extended war-
ranties); Madhubalan Viswanathan, Jose´ Antonio Rosa & James Edwin Harris, Deci-
sion Making and Coping of Functionally Illiterate Consumers and Some Implications for
Marketing Management, 69 (1) J. MARKETING 15, 27–28 (2005) (encouraging retail-
ers to use pictorial depictions of numerical product information to assist function-
ally illiterate consumers).
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